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This paper outlines the many geopolitical downsides to arming the Kurds while 
remaining agnostic to the domestic political benefits in the United States of being “tough” on the 
Islamic State. While there are certainly security and geopolitical reasons to engage through proxy 
with the Islamic State, domestic political pressure and a misunderstanding of who the Kurds 
actually are could cause the United States to act against its interests. Arming Kurdish militias 
like the People's Protection Units (YPG) is especially damaging to the United States’ relationship 
with Turkey, but also it harms its relations with Iraq and the other parties involved in the Syrian 
War. Furthermore, the long-term legacy of the recently botched Kurdish independence 
referendum is still unclear, and Kurdish leadership appears unstable at the moment. The United 
States should resuscitate its relationship with Turkey by discontinuing its armament of the YPG 
while applying economic coercion to gain leverage over the increasingly despotic regime. 
The Kurds are an anomaly in the Middle East. Numbering between 25 and 35 million 
people, they occupy the mountainous areas containing parts of Turkey, Iran, Armenia, Iraq, and 
Syria.1 In fact, they comprise the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East, but—barring the 
short-lived and Soviet-supported Kurdish Republic of Mahabad2—the Kurds have never secured 
a stable state of their own. They have also experienced repeated political abuses within their 
respective countries and from global powers, including the United States. In September 2017, the 
Kurds made headlines when the United States’ Department of Defense, under President Donald 
Trump and Secretary of Defense James Mattis, reportedly funneled “billions of dollars’ worth of 
Soviet-era weaponry to anti-Islamic State groups in Syria, with questionable oversight.”3 These 
groups include the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG, which is fighting against the 
                                                 
1  “Who are the Kurds?” BBC News, October 31, 2017, accessed November 28, 2017. 
2 Behnam Ben Taleblu and Merve Tahiroglu, “Kurd Your Enthusiasm,” Foreign Affairs November 25, 2017. 
3 “Who are the Kurds?”  
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Islamic State (IS) alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces. According to a September 2017 
report spearheaded by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and the 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), the Pentagon provided $2.2 billion worth of 
weaponry to such rebel groups.4  
It is difficult to discern5 whether the Pentagon will continue to arm the YPG, however. At 
the moment, there are a number of contradictory claims coming from Turkey, the White House, 
and Secretary Mattis regarding any possible shift in the policy of arming the YPG. On November 
24, 2017, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced in a news conference that 
President Trump vowed to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that the United States 
would cease arming the YPG.6 When questioned, Trump’s National Security Team appeared 
taken aback by the announcement from Ankara and were uncertain how to respond.7 The State 
Department referred questions to the White House, and several hours transpired without 
confirmation from the National Security Council.8 A White House description of the call was 
cryptic, mentioning only that Trump notified Erdoğan of “pending adjustments to the military 
support provided to our partners on the ground in Syria.”9 Later, U.S. officials said they planned 
for American troops to continue working with Kurdish soldiers in northern Syria, with Secretary 
Mattis saying defiantly, “We’re not going to just walk away right now.”10  In short, whether the 
United States will continue arming the YPG is uncertain, but a synthesis of the various 
comments suggests that the United States might stop arming the YPG, though not right away. 
                                                 
4 Rhys Dubin, “The Pentagon Is Spending $2 Billion Running Soviet-Era Guns to Syrian Rebels,” Foreign Policy, 
September 12, 2017, accessed November 28, 2017. 







The lack of commitment to the Kurds in Washington, D.C., belies the fact that while the 
White House is willing to work with Kurdish groups such as the YPG in the fight against the 
Islamic State, this collaboration comes at a great political cost. Arming Kurdish nationalist 
groups such as the YPG risks offending allies and non-allies alike in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey due 
to the YPG’s association with the terrorist organization known as the The Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK). In Turkey, for instance, decades of conflict with the PKK have contributed to what 
looks from the outside like a raving, irrational hatred of many Kurdish groups. This hatred is not 
going away, however, and it must be taken seriously if the United States hopes to have Turkey as 
an ally, despite the countless domestic transgressions of President Erdoğan and the ruling Justice 
and Development Party (AKP). 
Depictions of a monolithic Kurdish society are often flawed but useful from a rhetorical 
perspective. For instance, the Turkish state broadly sees “the Kurds” and “the Kurdish question” 
as a threat. Rational or not, this animus is hard to deny. Specifically, Turkey’s former Deputy 
Prime Minister Beşir Atalay said in an interview that, throughout AKP rule since 2002, nearly 60 
percent of all “reforms and democratization initiatives” undertaken were in relation to “the 
Kurdish issue.”11 As the largest non-Turkish ethnic group in the country and, indeed, one of the 
largest nations of people in the world without a sovereign state,12 the Kurds have experienced a 
tempestuous relationship with the AKP and with Turkey. Furthermore, the Kurds “have been 
regarded as a potential threat to ‘Turkishness’ and thus to the territorial integrity of the state” for 
decades.13 Erdoğan has viewed their existence and their involvement in Parliament with 
                                                 
11 P. Seib and C. Senem, eds. Turkey’s Public Diplomacy (London: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2015), 193. 
12 “The Time of the Kurds,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 4, 2017, accessed November 30, 2017. 
13 Seib and Senem, Turkey’s Public Diplomacy, 197. 
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increasing apprehension since 2012, which was the deadliest year in the conflict between Turkey 
and the PKK since the arrest of PKK forerunner Abdullah Ocalan in 1999.14  
In contrast, the American public, foreign policy elites, and media seem to view Kurdish 
groups like the YPG favorably. Prominent online communities such as Imgur and Reddit lionize 
the northern Iraqi Kurdish fighters known as the Peshmerga in popular posts entitled “Can we 
get some love for the Peshmerga?”15 or “Meet Joanna Palani the Iranian-Kurdish YPG fighter 
with a $1 Million bounty on her head.”16 Because the Kurds have become a sort of “American 
darling” for their status as ISIS-busting underdogs,17 real deliberation concerning the “complex 
promises and pitfalls” of Kurdish independence has been underdeveloped.18 Alongside popular 
user-uploaded posts, legacy news organizations such as the New York Times publish articles like, 
“A Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard” or “To Save Iraq, Arm the Kurds.” The latter 
article makes a startling claim: “Turkey should not be a problem. Although it is currently 
fighting its own Kurdish population, it has close relations with the Iraqi Kurds.”19 While it is true 
that Iraq’s Kurdish situation is different from the Kurdish independence movements in Turkey, 
Syria, and Iran, this remark vastly underestimates the Turkish state’s hostility toward such 
movements, while overestimating the potential for independence movements in Iraq to be 
conducive to independence movements elsewhere. The fact that Iraq and Turkey trade with one 
another is no guarantor of good rapport. American media and public opinion regarding “the 
Kurds” consistently misunderstands the degree to which Turkey views Kurdish independence 
                                                 
14  Ibid., 203 
15 TheSevenDeadlySins, “Can We Get Some Love for the Peshmerga?” Imgur, May 23, 2016., 
https://imgur.com/gallery/lmhtn. 
16 Mossysabertoothtiger, “Meet Joanna Palani the Iranian-Kurdish YPG Fighter with a $1 Million Bounty on Her 
Head,” Imgur, February 9, 2017., https://imgur.com/gallery/pGRzG. 
17 Taleblu and Tahiroglu, “Kurd Your Enthusiasm.”  
18 Ibid. 
19 Aliza Marcus and Andrew Apostolou, “To Save Iraq, Arm the Kurds,” New York Times, December 21, 2017, 
accessed February 09, 2018., https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/opinion/to-save-iraq-arm-the-kurds.html. 
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movements anywhere as a direct—if not existential—threat. Furthermore, the overt lionization of 
Kurdish militias by American audiences could prompt actions that harm the United States’ 
relationship with Turkey and other countries in the region.  
For years, Western public opinion has fancied the Kurds as both a model minority for 
their emphasis on egalitarianism and as an unlikely player in international geopolitics.20 Some of 
this admiration is reasonable and hard-earned. Since multilateral air strikes began in September 
2014, the Peshmerga (a word which means “one who confronts death”) have reclaimed twenty-
five to thirty percent of territories lost to the Islamic State, effectively curbing ISIS’ access to 
revenue streams such as oil or natural gas.21 According to a first-person account in The Atlantic, 
the Kurds have proven to be a motivated and tactful fighting force: 
The soldiers I spoke with acknowledge many reasons previous 
U.S.-trained forces came up short. But this time is different, they 
insist. Iraq, along with the Kurds in northern Iraq, presents a bit of 
a perfect storm. They have new motivation and have shown it. 
They spent 2016 fighting for their homeland, taking huge losses, 
and keep fighting. They’re demonstrating advanced and improving 
skills. And the United States has their back, significantly. ISIS is 
on the run, on the battlefield.22  
 
At times, the Kurds seem like the only viable militia with enough organization and motivation to 
effectively fight ISIS without putting American boots on the ground. This has contributed to a 
sort of mythos wherein the Kurdish people, their interests, their ideals, their intentions, and their 
short-term successes are emphasized, while long-term military capabilities and the interests of 
NATO allies are sidelined. Claims that the Kurds’ values and interests align with those of the 
United States might have some moral or interpersonal insight, but they lack a real understanding 
                                                 
20 G. E. Fuller, Turkey and the Arab Spring: Leadership in the Middle East (Bozorg Press, 2014). 
21 Denise Natali, “Counting on the Kurds,” Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2017, accessed November 25, 2017. 
22 Kevin Baron, “How the U.S. Military Sees the Anti-ISIS Fight,” The Atlantic, January 18, 2017, accessed 
November 28, 2017. 
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of the dynamics of the contemporary Middle East and the criteria for a political order that lasts 
after U.S. forces go home.  
Recent Events in Iraqi Kurdistan 
One clear takeaway from the past year is that “the Kurds” are not a monolithic entity of 
principled do-gooders at odds with the chaos of the contemporary Middle East. Although some 
of them fit that description, they are generally an alluring but dysfunctional group of fragmented 
cultures with sometimes-untenable ideals caught in the same, complex calculus as other factions 
in the region. There is certainly descriptive power in understanding how “the Kurds” are 
perceived: For Turkey, they are inherently rebellious insurgents; for the United States, they are a 
vaguely heroic entity with a somewhat common cause to the American agenda.23 The rest of this 
article, however, assumes that any depiction of a monolithic Kurdistan has little prescriptive 
relevance. 
On a regional level, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) or Iraqi Kurdistan, has 
grown emboldened in its petitions for land and independence in recent months and years. For 
example, when Kurdish militias regained Sinjar from ISIS in 2015, the leader of Iraq’s Kurdish 
region, Masoud Barzani, claimed that only the Kurdish flag would fly in the newly liberated 
territory.24 Barzani’s statement was a bold attempt to secure some form of political independence 
for Iraqi Kurdistan, but the government of Iraq militarily asserted that the area, with its lucrative 
oil fields, must remain under federal control.25  
                                                 
23 Nick Danforth, “Do Kurds Exist?” Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2017, accessed November 25, 2017., 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-10-26/do-kurds-exist 
24 Loveday Morris, “How the Kurdish Independence Referendum Backfired Spectacularly,” The Washington Post, 
October 20, 2017, accessed November 28, 2017., https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/how-the-kurdish-
independence-referendum-backfired-/2017/10/20/3010c820-b371-11e7-9b93-
b97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.d53b1b60ed6d. 
25 Morris, “How the Kurdish Independence Movement Backfired Spectacularly.” 
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More recently, in September 2017, Barzani spearheaded an independence referendum in 
Iraq. The vote was accompanied by “euphoric celebrations in the streets of Irbil and other 
Kurdish cities,” but the realities of global geopolitics soon quashed the celebratory mood.26 
Washington, Ankara, Tehran, and Baghdad all objected to the referendum, but Barzani and the 
KRG believed that Iraq’s neighbors would be unwilling or unlikely to “muster sustained 
sanctions or a blockade.”27 When the referendum occurred, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi 
ordered his forces to recapture the city of Kirkuk from the Peshmerga.28 As sporadic fighting 
broke out, many Peshmerga were ordered to stand down.29 In the end, the referendum backfired 
spectacularly, both politically and as a personal PR mishap for Barzani. Pundits of all stripes 
dubbed the event an “unmitigated disaster” for its miscalculation of American, Turkish, Iranian, 
and especially Iraqi capacity and willingness to rally an adequate response.30 Perhaps the KRG 
assumed that trade ties between the KRG and Turkey would soften any historical animosities and 
limit the Turks’ resentment toward the referendum.31 In any case, Iraqi Kurdistan lay in political 
disarray, and the sacrosanctity of territorial integrity proved, once again, to carry more weight in 
global geopolitics than anticipated. 
The Peshmerga and the Fight against IS 
While viewing the Kurds solely as combatants against the Islamic State is unwise, the 
Kurds have undoubtedly proven to be a “committed and pragmatic partner” in the fight against 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Alex Dziadosz, “The Economic Case against an Independent Kurdistan,” The Atlantic, September 26, 2017, 
accessed November 28, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/kurdistan-barzani-iraq-
turkey-blockade-oil/541149/. 
28 Morris, “How the Kurdish Independence Movement Backfired Spectacularly.” 
29 Ibid. 
30 Zaid Al-Ali, “What Next for Iraq after the Failed Kurdish Referendum?” Al Jazeera, October 29, 2017, accessed 




IS.32 The Kurdish Peshmerga have battled radical Islamist groups, and they have a history of 
striking “politically expedient alliances to protect their interests and territory.”33 In other words, 
the Kurds do have value in fighting against the Islamic State:  
These alliances, alongside coalition airstrikes, have borne fruit. 
Iraqi Kurds claim to have retaken about 10,500 miles of territory 
from ISIS while providing sanctuary for nearly two million 
refugees and internally displaced persons, 19 percent of whom are 
Sunni Arabs. Diyala is now the only province in northern Iraq with 
no ISIS presence. Kobani and about 100 surrounding Syrian 
villages are also ISIS-free. These gains coincide with coordinated 
Kurdish–Sunni Arab battles around Aleppo that have pushed ISIS 
back to strongholds in Raqqa, Deir al-Zor, Al-Hasakah city, and 
the surrounding countryside.34 
 
Nevertheless, even the most optimistic observers note that Peshmerga forces’ “successes” have 
profound negative externalities. For instance, coalition air strikes antagonize Sunni Arabs, the 
support of whom the United States needs to repel the Islamic State and pursue lasting peace.35 
The successes of the YPG are encouraging “transborder Kurdish nationalism,” which is a thorn 
in the side of Turkish and Iranian claims to territorial integrity.36 Finally, Kurdish independence 
movements’ fight against ISIS is fracturing the Kurds.37  
Not only is a monolithic, unified Kurdistan a rhetorical mirage, but the Kurds’ allegiance 
to the United States is also problematized by a complex history. While the Kurds have spent 
decades cultivating an image as a “stable, private-sector friendly outpost in a region fraught by 
sectarian turmoil,” this does not necessarily mean that they trust or view Washington favorably.38 
                                                 
32 Natali, “Counting on the Kurds.” 
33 Ibid. 




38 Dov Friedman and Cale Salih, “Kurds to the Rescue,” Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2017, accessed November 
25, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2014-06-17/kurds-rescue 
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Although the KRG appears opportunistic, they know well the sting of empty promises from the 
United States: 
History is an issue too. Simply mention the year 1975 to any Kurd, 
and, within moments, one will hear of U.S. Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger’s “betrayal”—the Algiers Agreement, which 
temporarily ended the conflict between Iraq and Iran. The 
agreement left the Iraqi Kurds, who had supported the Iranian 
Shah, to suffer at the hands of the Baathists. The treachery is 
seared into Kurdistan’s collective memory as a reminder of the 
dangers of leaving oneself to the mercy of the established 
powers.39 
 
The Kurds have experienced more recent Western duplicity as well. Near the beginning of the 
Iraq War, U.S. special forces and Peshmerga joined forces against the Ansar al-Islam 
insurgency.40 The Kurds thought they had demonstrated their role as staunch allies of the United 
States, but Paul Bremer, head of the coalition provisional government in Iraq, “sought to disarm 
them.”41 After “sweeping” through Kirkuk in 2003, pressure from the United States prompted 
the Kurds to pull back—an event the KRG authorities lamented for years before recapturing the 
“revered” city in 2017.42   
As with many foreign entanglements, history is a liability for the United States when 
dealing with the Kurds. While interests align for the moment, those who anticipate an 
enthusiastic Kurdish ally into the foreseeable future are likely to be disappointed. For this reason 
and many others, viewing the Kurds solely in reference to the fight against the Islamic State is 
problematic and short-sighted. 
 
 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid. 
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Turkey and the Kurds: A Tumultuous Relationship 
Turkey and its president,  Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have a tumultuous relationship with the 
country’s Kurds, which make up 15 to 20 percent of the total population.43 Since Abdullah 
Ocalan established the PKK in the 1970s to call for an independent Kurdish state, more than 
40,000 people have been killed and hundreds of thousands displaced.44 Turkey considers the 
YPG (whom the U.S. allegedly armed with Soviet-era weaponry) and the PYD (a Kurdish 
opposition party in Syria) as extensions of the PKK. The YPG denies this, and the United States 
appears to treat the YPG and the PKK as separate entities despite evidence to the contrary. 
Meanwhile, the Turkish government seems to prioritize military actions against the PKK over 
the Islamic State as the U.S. partners with the Kurds to fight ISIS.45 Suffice it to say, there is a 
profound disconnect between the values of the United States and Turkey and their military 
priorities. 
From the viewpoint of the Turkish state, supporting or arming “the Kurds” is akin to 
advocating for terrorism, working against Turkish national sovereignty, undermining 
“Turkishness” and Ottoman imperial aspirations, and dismissing the interests of Erdoğan and the 
AKP. In fact, Erdoğan explicitly stated this. When the United States ordered a munitions airdrop 
to the Syrian city of Kobani, Erdoğan retorted with a brash accusation: “The U.S. did this in spite 
of us. I told them the aid you’re sending is going to a terror group.”46 From the Turkish 
perspective, the United States is choosing the support of a group of stateless, quasi-Marxist 
rebels over an ally with one of the largest armies in NATO. Moral or not, the values and interests 
                                                 
43 “Who are the Kurds?”  
44 Ibid.  
45 S. Almukhtar and T. Wallace, “Why Turkey Is Fighting the Kurds Who Are  
Fighting ISIS,” The New York Times, August 11, 2015, accessed November 30, 2017., 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/08/12/world/middleeast/turkey-kurds-isis.html. 
46 Piotr Zalewski, “Contentious Kurds,” Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2017, accessed November 25, 2017., 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2014-11-02/contentious-kurds 
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of the Turkish government prioritize military actions against the PKK as much as, if not more 
than, the Islamic State.47 Again, Erdoğan quipped in a trip to Latvia, “To us, ISIS is the same as 
PKK.”48 Although Western capitals were incensed at the quote, Erdoğan’s quote reflected the 
popular opinion in Turkey, where 43.7 percent of Turks see the PKK as a greater threat to their 
country than ISIS.49 From a purely realist perspective, the United States would do well to tap into 
the interests of allies such as Turkey and use these as leverage rather than trying to morph them 
through tacit coercion, passive aggression, and tone-deaf idealism.   
Ottomanism and Erdoğanism 
 While some of Turkey’s hatred of the Kurds originates from real-world violence at the 
hands of the PKK, some of it stems unilaterally from the shrewd political maneuvering of 
President Erdoğan and the AKP. With the abandonment of peace talks between the Turkish 
government and the ethnic Kurds, an eruption of conflict paralyzed much of the southern and 
eastern quadrants of Turkey in 2015.50 The AKP and President Erdoğan, in particular, were at 
odds with the Kurds politically—especially after the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party 
(HDP) procured 10 percent of the seats in Turkey’s parliamentary elections in 2015, effectively 
thwarting Erdoğan’s bid to expand the powers of the presidency at the time.51  
In September 2015, after the AKP momentarily lost traction but before the November 
elections in which it gained back its electorate, Foreign Policy cited increasingly divisive 
                                                 
47 Almukhtar and Wallace, “Why Turkey Is Fighting.”  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid. 
50 “The Hatred Never Went Away,” The Economist, September 10, 2015, accessed April 15, 2016., 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21664225-civilians-join-fight-between-soldiers-and-guerrillas-burying-
years-calm-hatred-never. 
51 D. Zakheim, “Turkey’s Two-Faced Deal,” Foreign Policy, July 29, 2015, accessed November 25, 2017., 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/29/turkeys-two-faced-deal/. 
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rhetoric and legal/military actions against the Kurds as a somewhat transparent attempt to 
consolidate power and rally its nationalist base:  
Rather than accepting the challenge of building a coalition 
government in a polarized political climate, Erdoğan, it quickly 
became clear, was more interested in forcing another election in 
which a more favorable result would return his party to power 
single-handedly. The voters had “made a mistake,” Erdoğan 
declared, but the next round of voting would “correct the 
problems” it created. Playing on long-standing fears that coalition 
government would lead to chaos, Erdoğan told voters that only an 
AKP majority could bring the country stability.52 
 
Indeed, fighting between the PKK and the Turkish government intensified with “renewed fury” 
in the weeks and months before the elections in November 2015: 
The AKP is now hoping the resurgence of Turkey’s war on 
Kurdish separatists will help woo back nationalist voters and that 
renewed PKK violence will discredit the pro-Kurdish People’s 
Democratic Party (HDP), whose success in June thwarted 
Erdoğan’s ambitions. With violence spreading into cities and onto 
the streets and the value of the Turkish lira falling, Erdoğan 
continues to insist this all could have been avoided if the AKP had 
achieved an appropriate majority in the last election.53 
 
Of course, any speculation or assumption regarding the intentions of the AKP runs the risk of 
oversimplification or, worse, spreading inaccuracies. Many signs, however, indicate that the 
AKP systematically ramped up political rhetoric at the expense of liberalism and the rule of 
law—a process that arguably continues today. In addition to the rampant human rights abuses in 
cities such as Cizre in southern Turkey, it is worth noting that the Kurdish issue has been among 
the AKP’s most successful instruments in the attempt to consolidate power and suppress dissent 
over the past decade, with increased vigor in the past few years. By the same token, American 
                                                 
52 Nick Danforth, “How Low Will Erdoğan Go?” Foreign Policy, September 11, 2015, accessed November 25, 
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support for Kurdish militias fuels anti-American sentiments not only among the upper echelons 
of the AKP, but also among those affected by PKK violence in southern Turkey who are looking 
for a strongman. The authoritarian drift in Turkey is phenomenally complex, although some of it 
stems from the fact that a panicky electorate saw the world around it descending into chaos. 
Meanwhile, the United States and NATO were not only unreliably absent during Turkey’s search 
for security; they seemed to be arming the very people who posed the threat in the first place. 
This provided avenues for Erdoğan and others to seize the reigns and fill the security vacuum 
with newfound vigor—asserting himself and his party as the champions of order and security in 
the country.  
 Much of this fear-laced zeal takes the form of an Ottoman idealism unique to Erdoğan’s 
AKP. Many AKP supporters celebrate the cultural shift within Turkey’s government from 
regarding the Ottoman empire as regressive and corrosive to something worthy of celebration 
and continuation.54 Others note that such “jaundiced invocations of the Ottoman past” can blind 
the AKP to the region’s willingness to be swept into the fold of “Erdoğanism” or 
“Ottomanism.”55 The Kurds do not view the Ottoman period as favorably as the AKP, and they 
are more willing to resist than the Turkish government presumes. Another feature of Erdoğanism 
is a near-paranoia regarding outside influence in Turkish affairs, which spiked after the 
attempted coup in July of 2016. Westerners, Kurds, secularists, journalists, and followers of the 
Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen—these are the imposters against whom there is no defense but 
Erdoğanism: 
As far as Erdoğan’s right-wing and Islamist supporters are 
concerned, the coup attempt was not only a domestic attack but 
also a plot by scheming “foreign allies” to overthrow Erdoğan 
through their Gulenist proxies. His supporters insist that it was 
                                                 
54 Ryan Gingeras, “Ottoman Ghosts,” Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2017, accessed November 25, 2017. 
55 Ibid. 
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simply the latest in a series of historical attacks the West has 
launched against the Turkish nation and the umma, stretching back 
to the Crusades. According to this line of thinking, by targeting 
Erdoğan and the Turkish state simultaneously, these nefarious 
foreign interests inextricably linked the future of the country to the 
fate of the leader: without Erdoğan, Turkey cannot become a great 
nation again or fulfill its historical mission of restoring the dignity 
of the umma.56 
 
Again, while observers in the West might call this a feature of the AKP paranoia, it is 
undoubtedly a shrewd and effective political instrument. By arming “the Kurds,” the United 
States risks further alienating and further destabilizing the Turkish regime, giving more fodder 
for AKP authoritarianism, and prompting Turkey, a NATO ally, to balance against the United 
States. Turkey is too important and the Kurds too fragile for the United States to risk disaffecting 
a key player in its current geopolitical strategy.  
The Trump Presidency and the Unknown Future of Turkey and the Kurds 
Turkey’s willingness over the past several years to reach out to Russia and Iran—both 
historical rivals— is worrisome because it suggests that Ankara has “given up on Washington.”57 
After the 2016 election of U.S. President Donald Trump, however, Ankara hoped for a new era 
in U.S.-Turkish relations.58 President Erdoğan congratulated Trump on his success and began to 
exhibit anti-Iranian rhetoric to show a readiness to contain Iranian aggression in Syria and 
beyond.59 He also hoped Washington would stop, or at least curtail, its support for the YPG, 
which he and the Turkish government view as a direct wing of the PKK.60 Instead, the Trump 
administration increased its support for the YPG, since it sees the YPG as the only militia in the 
                                                 
56 Soner Cagaptay and Oya Rose Aktas, “How Erdoğanism Is Killing Turkish Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, 
November 25, 2017, accessed November 25, 2017., https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2017-07-
07/how-erdoganism-killing-turkish-democracy 
57 Gonul Tol and Alex Vatanka, “Turkey’s New Alliances,” Foreign Affairs, November 28, 2017, accessed 





region capable of fighting the Islamic State.61 In response, Ankara continued to turn to Moscow 
for support—by purchasing Russia’s S-400 anti-aircraft missile system, for example— which 
indicates increased foreign policy aggression and a deep frustration with both NATO and the 
United States.62 Iran has taken note of this fact, and it has started vocalizing unprecedented anti-
Kurdish rhetoric against the YPG.63 Indeed, much of the geopolitical positioning in Syria is in 
opposition to the YPG, not the Islamic State. By siding with the YPG, the United States 
government is arguably siding with the group most despised by all the state actors involved in 
Syria. 
The Trump administration presents uncertainties to all parties involved. President Trump 
has quipped that he does not feel the same obligations toward existing U.S. policies and 
relations, such as when he flip-flopped on whether he was bound to a “one China” policy in 
December 2016.64 Non-state actors that aspire to independence hope this unorthodox posture 
signals openness to recognizing new states. One article has pointed out that they are right to 
hope, as Trump’s choice for Secretary of State at the time, former ExxonMobil CEO Rex 
Tillerson,65 sent a message to Kurdish leaders: “Tillerson may not be an experienced diplomat, 
but he is a friendly face to the Kurds, having overseen ExxonMobil’s expansion to Kurdistan in 
2011.” The article continues, “Tillerson’s experiences as an oil mogul have been met with a mix 
of concern and praise in Washington, but they are generally viewed as an advantage by the oil-
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rich Kurdistan Region of Iraq.”66 Indeed, oil may be a major factor in Tillerson’s appointment, 
and the KRG relies on oil sales for 90 percent of its revenue.67 Among “oil executives and 
seasoned Iraq analysts,” for instance, some have proposed that many Kurds, especially in Iraq, 
can be motivated by the outlook of “oil revenues and budgetary guarantees” alone.68 The KRG 
sends roughly three million barrels of oil to Ceyhan, Turkey, but it has met resistance when 
selling globally.69 This is at least in part because of interventions from the Iraqi government. In 
response, some have posited that if the United States helps facilitate and ease the way for KRG 
oil trading, Kurdish militias would be more likely to support the United States in the battle 
against the Islamic State.70 
The Trump presidency has interesting effects on the Kurdish question. Broadly, President 
Trump’s inexperience and ineptitude is viewed by those on the losing side of U.S. foreign policy 
as a potential for positive gain. His complete lack of diplomatic protocol could provide “useful 
gaffes” or helpful improvisations that serve Kurdish interests.71 This lack of tact was seen when 
then-president-elect Trump received a complimentary phone call from the Taiwanese president, 
much to the chagrin of the Chinese.72 A similar situation with the Kurds could create leverage or 
elicit a reaction from Turkey to the Kurds’ benefit. While the Kurds might view the situation in 
hopeful expectation, the actual effects of the Trump presidency on the United States’ relationship 
with Turkey is yet to be known. If Trump’s bombastic rhetoric regarding the fight against the 
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Islamic State is any guide to his foreign policy priorities, it might not bode well for the United 




Economic coercion and incentives aimed at the AKP are certainly a risky and direct 
method, but these might be among the few languages to which the AKP elite will listen 
attentively. President Erdoğan has proven that he does not receive verbal criticism well, but 
Turkey’s geopolitical goals require him to pay attention to energy policy and security.73 Turkey 
is situated between the world’s largest consumers and producers of energy and, like Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, Erdoğan’s mass appeal is, in part, predicated on his ability to maintain 
the flow of energy through Turkey.74 In quiet moments, Turkey aspires to be the “energy hub” of 
the region, specifically in the transfer of natural gas from Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan to Europe.75 
Disregarding the irony of Turkey’s apparent desire to trade with Iraqi Kurdistan, this ambition 
presents a genuine opportunity for the United States. In this turbulent moment for energy 
security in Turkey and the world, the United States is in a position to use this concern as 
leverage. For example, the conflict with the PKK in Southeastern Turkey threatens the transfer of 
oil from Iraqi Kurdistan, through Turkey, and into Europe.76 In addition, the PKK is known to 
sabotage natural gas pipelines in the region, such as the Kirkuk-Ceyhan natural gas pipeline, the 
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Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline, and the 
Turkey-Iran natural gas pipeline.77  
A worthwhile counterpoint to those hoping to rekindle ties with Turkey is that the policy 
of placating Erdoğan is actually a sort of appeasement. How can the United States pursue its 
interests in the region with Turkey’s support and without writing a blank check to the “New 
Sultan?” In response, many foreign policy experts? are calling for a more assertive response to 
Erdoğan’s provocations: “If Erdoğan knows that he needs the United States, the thinking goes, 
Washington can take a tougher line with him and secure more cooperative behavior.”78 This is a 
salient point. The pursuit of an “assertive” response, however, should not translate into arming 
the YPG. Rather, it should mean working through diplomacy, economic coercion and incentives, 
removing the barriers to cooperation, soft power, and other methods.  
From the position of the United States, Turkey’s energy interests represent a remarkable 
opportunity to relieve Turkey of the burden of energy insecurity by facilitating exports from Iraqi 
Kurdistan. First, the United States can broker deals with the Kurds in Iraq and provide protection 
to natural gas pipelines threatened by the PKK. Then, by strategically leveraging interests in the 
region, the United States can help lift the burden of energy insecurity in exchange for key shifts 
in AKP policy in Syria, toward the Islamic State, regarding the refugee crisis, or even domestic 
reform. For example, the U.S. could offer air defense, intelligence, or UAV support to protect 
pipelines in southeastern Turkey, which would be a service to both the KRG and the Turkish 
government with the added political benefit of being tough on the PKK. Third, the United States 
could “quietly drop its objections to Kurdish independent oil sales” in Iraq and help secure safe 
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passage of KRG oil tankers in international waters.79 In any event, strengthening Iraqi Kurdistan 
economically is more sensible than arming the YPG. If an independent Kurdistan were to be 
established anywhere, it would make the most sense for it to be in Iraqi Kurdistan because of the 
stability it could provide Iraq and the nature of the KRG. Furthermore, overseeing increased 
trade between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan provides an avenue to support certain Kurdish militias 
that provide a buffer against the Islamic State without appearing sympathetic to either the PKK 
or the YPG. If an independent Kurdistan lies in the distant future, it should emerge and sustain 
itself with minimal U.S. ties and obligations. Increased trade would not only strengthen 
economic ties between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, provide an independent revenue stream for 
the KRG, bolster a functioning Kurdish civil society, and help fund those fighting the Islamic 
State through increased trade revenue, but also it could lessen Turkey’s reliance on Russian oil 
and Iranian natural gas. Increased trade would serve as a timely reminder to Turkey of its desire 
and need for the patronage of the United States. This relationship is sweetened for the KRG by 
the prospect of selling more gas in Turkey, which, because of a lack of both transportation and 
storage, costs double the European price.80 In economic terms, Turkey is a “premium market” 
when it comes to gas exports.81 Everybody wants to sell to Turkey, and the United States has the 
opportunity to broker a solution while gaining important concessions from the AKP. All parties 
can save face, and the United States can increase its prestige in the region with minimal 
monetary or military investment.  
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Of course, the logistical triangulation of this recommendation alone is significant, and the 
status of Iraqi Kurdistan after the botched referendum is still unknown. It requires many parties 
to coordinate across a number of cultural and political barriers, and the Trump administration’s 
apparent distaste for diplomatic procedure certainly does not help matters. However, with United 
States’ diplomatic resources and economic leadership, it is far more realistic and has a clearer 
definition of success than a number of other available political options that center on arming 
non-state actors to fight other non-state actors.  
The first step in achieving this goal is to rebut the damaging narrative that the United 
States is actively arming Turkey’s enemies. Turkey has sided with countries such as Russia and 
Iran in recent years to balance against the United States. While Turkey has failed to bandwagon 
with these countries with much enthusiasm, it does so in part because of America’s perceived 
closeness to the Kurds. This poses a problem since, as The Atlantic astutely noted, “There is no 
path to victory over ISIS without Erdogan.”82 Turkey is an important national security ally, a 
NATO partner, the host country for 70 to 80 U.S. nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Force Base, 
and a necessary player in the global refugee crisis. For this reason and many others, few in the 
U.S. government are itching to lose Turkey’s friendship entirely: 
The historic weight of Turkey’s alliance with the United States, its 
regional influence, and its capacity to derail other U.S. interests 
have led officials to conclude that, one way or another, the bilateral 
relationship must remain functional. Like that of former President 
Barack Obama, the administration of Donald Trump has therefore 
sought other means to placate Turkish anger over the United 
States’ ongoing support for Kurdish forces in Syria. In addition to 
offering intelligence about PKK targets outside of Syria, the 
administration has muted its criticism of Turkey’s democratic 
decline and continues to offer Erdoğan public meetings with the 
U.S. president.83 
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If American national security interests were the only consideration—discounting ideals or 
abstract notions of human rights or political pressures to defeat the Islamic State—the verdict 
would be clear: The United States should stop supporting Kurdish forces like the YPG and 
instead focus on its relationship with Turkey. Turkey has far more to offer the United States, and 
its military capabilities are far greater than the YPG or any other Kurdish group. Turkey is too 
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